Picking up the Pieces of the Gordian Knot: Towards a Sensible Merger
Methodology
Bruce A. Antkowiak, Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University1
In an apparent attempt to demonstrate that “succinct” is an art form, Justice John
Flaherty of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summed up the relevant criminal
wrongdoings of Steven Keith Anderson in this way: “On October 31, 1987 Anderson shot
Norma DeBooth in the neck as she stood at the kitchen sink preparing dinner. She is now
a quadriplegic.”2
Struck as the reader may be with the pathos of this horrible circumstance, they
will learn nothing more of about the whys and wherefores of its occurrence. The reader
will not be told who Anderson was in relation to Ms. DeBooth, whether it was passion or
greed or sheer malevolence over what she was cooking that motivated his pulling the
trigger, or whether the future may bring her hope of recovery. Rather, all we will learn is
that Anderson was convicted under the laws of Pennsylvania of both attempted murder
and aggravated assault and, more importantly, that he was sentenced consecutively for
each crime.3 For the legacy of this tragic and fateful encounter is that in its brief
retelling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set the legal stage for the announcement of
Pennsylvania’s seminal opinion on the law of merger.
Of all the things to talk about in Anderson’s case, or anyone else’s for that matter,
why talk about merger? More to the point for those who have read this far and are
morbidly fascinated about continuing, why is merger a topic worth the time it will take
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you to reach the conclusion? There are two very good reasons for this effort that students
of law, particularly those who practice and adjudicate it, will appreciate. There is also
one more I will save for the end that may help remind us of the deeper and nobler
business we are about every day in the criminal courts of the nation.
The first reason is that once enough people who have the responsibility to address
the jurisprudence of the Double Jeopardy Clause read Professor Anne Poulin’s recent
article, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot,4 the law
regarding merger will change. While I will discuss more details of Professor Poulin’s
work later, suffice it to say here that it compels Double Jeopardy Clause analysis to
henceforth proceed along a path solely concerned with successive prosecution situations.
Merger is left on an island, an issue of non-constitutional dimension, an issue where the
“only question is whether the punishment exceeds that intended by the legislature.”5
Merger is about to be permanently uprooted from its perceived foundation in Double
Jeopardy, and dealing with that displacement is an issue that must be addressed.
Second, merger analysis has been, to be charitable, a mess. In this context, I will
use the law of Pennsylvania as an illustration of the severe problems courts have
encountered in dealing with it, but the problem runs deep, in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.
Demonstrating an unusual gift for understatement, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has characterized merger as “not an easy problem” that readily devolves into the
kind of policy debate (rehabilitation versus incapacitation) that judges should rightly
avoid.6 A distinguished member of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has observed that
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there have “not been many issues that have received from the courts more uneven
treatment than claims that offenses have merged for the purposes of sentencing.”7
Merger approaches announced in one case are often repudiated not long after,8 and
garnering a majority approach on even one aspect of the doctrine is difficult.9
Merger is a doctrine in search of a methodology.

For years, courts have

recognized their inability to establish a coherent approach to the matter. Merger has little
of a true identity in the law, and the law is not sure what to do with it. In short, it is a
mess.
Looking for its historical origins will not help clean up the mess. The doctrine of
merger is rooted in English common law10 principles that provided that a misdemeanor
would merge into a felony, if one act resulted in both a felony and a misdemeanor.11 At
common law felonies were not merged into felonies and misdemeanors were not merged
into misdemeanors.12
There have been multiple theories advanced as to the underlying purpose of the
common law merger doctrine. Some commentators argue that the rule reflected the
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Commonwealth v. Campbell, 505 A.2d 262, 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
See Commonwealth v. Leon Williams, 559 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1989)
At step two a court has to determine exactly how the
Commonwealth has been injured (how many “evils” are present)
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interests and the facts of the case. Although we ourselves
promulgated this analysis in Michael Williams, we now feel the
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procedural differences between misdemeanor and felony trials at common law, with
misdemeanor trials affording the accused many rights that were not similarly granted in
felony proceedings.13 Another justification for merger is that it was intended to prevent
defendant harassment by reprosecution for the same conduct.14 The merger rule may
have also developed based on the notion that the defendant’s mens rea and the social
harm resulting from his conduct are the same, and therefore to divide the defendant’s
conduct is illogical.15
The passage of time took its toll on these theories justifying the common law
merger doctrine. Felony defendants were eventually afforded the same procedural
protections as misdemeanor defendants.16 Also passing was the era of common law
crimes where courts were integral in setting elements that determined degrees of guilt and
potential punishments. Pennsylvania, for example, explicitly abolished common law
crimes, and proclaimed that something is a crime if, and only if, the legislature has so
designated it in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code.17 Common law merger was abandoned
by the English courts in 185118 and most American courts have repudiated it as well.19
But old habits die hard. The courts sometimes cannot help themselves thinking
that they still dictate the societal judgment of what a crime is and what its maximum
penalty should be. Whether using the common law or the Constitution, they try to find
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devices to indulge their desire to resist surrendering this sacred ground to the legislature.
That resistance may be at the root of the mess that surrounds merger.
But with the evolution of the jurisprudence in this area, coherence in a merger
methodology is within reach. Forced to explicitly let go of the common law legacy in
this area, the courts must now accept that this evolution has revealed a major premise that
permeates all aspects of a reasoned analysis of any merger problem. That premise is
where we begin.
A. The Major Premise: A Gordian Knot Broken
The major premise is this: merger is not a constitutional issue. It is, from
beginning to end and in all particulars, an issue of statutory construction. The
court’s sole task is to discern the intent of the legislature about whether the defendant is
eligible for consecutive sentences for violating two or more sections of the Crimes Code.
To answer merger questions, no part of the Constitution, not even the Double Jeopardy
Clause that we are so fond of raising when we speak of merger, need be consulted.
While courts have sometimes divorced double jeopardy principles from merger,20
more often they have seen them as complimentary or even symbiotic doctrines. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held, for example, that “there is no difference between a
double jeopardy analysis and a merger analysis: double jeopardy and merger are identical
and the operative consideration in both is whether the elements of the offenses are the
same or different.”21

20.
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But as Professor Poulin argues, the doctrines do not equate.22 In an extensive and
thoughtful rendering of the matter, she demonstrates that while the test from Blockburger
v. United States23 is used for both successive prosecution and multiple punishment
(merger) analysis, it is truly a test for legislative intent only, and is ill suited to the core
double jeopardy concerns arising in the successive prosecution cases.24 By tying the
merger analysis to the successive prosecution strand, she argues, the courts have created a
Gordian knot which weakens the constitutional protections true double jeopardy analysis
should hold out.25 Breaking that knot, she hopes, will focus double jeopardy analysis on
the successive prosecution strand only, and give it its core meaning.26
Professor Poulin’s analysis will enhance merger theory as well. First, eliminating
constitutional overtones from it will focus the inquiry on the pure issue at hand: what
punishments did the legislature intend for this defendant. But more important, it will
shift the constitutional inquiry out of merger and on to where it belongs -- in sentencing
once the merger question has been answered. Lurking in the mist in the post-merger
world are issues not of double jeopardy, but of whether the legislature’s intent to impose
that level of punishment amounts to something cruel and unusual (disproportionately or
otherwise) and/or whether the prosecutor’s choice to charge multiple counts to enhance
the potential sentence amounts to some form of due process violation.
To
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punishment/disproportionality analysis and abuse of prosecutorial discretion may open
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few doors for a defendant given their current state of relative uncertainty.27 But when
merger is fused with double jeopardy, we tend to put a constitutional imprimatur on
merger decisions they do not merit. As merger is a non-constitutional issue in itself, the
case where a prosecutor has opted to charge as many counts as the legislature has
“intended” (and the sentencing court has opted to run each of those sentences
consecutively) will frame whatever true constitutional issues actually exist in the case.
B. Merger as Legislative Intent: A Matter of Mischief
The major premise is not exactly one that has never appeared in print. Indeed, it
has become a mantra in merger cases to recite that, of course, the fundamental task of the
court is one of statutory construction.28 The trick is how to go about it.
27.
As to Eight Amendment arguments, United States Supreme Court opinions have
permitted such consideration in only the most exceptional of situations. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983), Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) and Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Pennsylvania Courts are generally in accord, see Commonwealth v.
Parker, 718 A.2d 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) and Commonwealth v. Spells, 612 A.2d 458 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992). However, review of sentences under an abuse of discretion standard divorced from the constitutional
claim is at least possible. See Commonwealth v. Dodge 859 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
As to prosecutorial misconduct issues, the issue is even more opaque and unlikely to result in relief for a
defendant. See Georgetown Law Journal 2006 p. 208-16. And a concurring justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has expressed the hope that prosecutors will use good judgment in such cases. See
Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098, 1101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
28.
“Generally, the doctrine of merger is a rule of statutory construction designed to
determine whether the legislature intended for the punishment of one offense to encompass that for another
offense arising from the same criminal act or transaction.” Anderson, 650 A.2d at 21; see also Gatling, 807
A.2d at 895 (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 764 A.2d 1056, 1057 (Pa. 2001).
The Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Campbell also stated that statutory construction was part
of merger analysis:
Instead of looking solely to the elements of the offenses charged, the court must
look to the underlying facts. Also, an examination of the statutes under which
appellant has been convicted is essential. It is important to determine whether the
facts reveal that the offenses charged caused more than one injury to the
Commonwealth. In doing so, we must attempt to ascertain the legislative intent.
Campbell, 505 A.2d at 265-66 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 496 A.2d 31, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985). See also Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). In Commonwealth v.
Williams, 871 A.2d 254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), the Court observed that ‘[i]f the legislature were to tell us
that crime A merges with crime B, the problem would not arise, for the legislative intent would be
manifest”. The Court did express chagrin at the fact that when no such explicit instruction is given, the
court must devise its own consistent rule of merger, a task the court admitted proves to be “difficult.”
Williams, 871 A.2d at 262.
The Court also has difficulty being consistent about whether merger is a constitutional or a
statutory problem, creating more confusion. Another Superior Court panel has observed that merger is not
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Sometimes, legislative intent with respect to merger is easy.

Where a

Pennsylvania defendant is charged with burglary, for example,29 the statute itself bars
conviction for burglary and the object crime “unless the additional offense constitutes a
felony of the first or second degree.”30 In most cases, however, it is not that easy.
The search for legislative intent must logically begin with the idea of what the
legislature was trying to do when it passed the criminal statute in question. Courts are
supposed to read that intention from the clear words of the statute but, when things are
more inscrutable, courts are to look to the “mischief to be remedied” by the law.31
That “mischief” has a particular form in criminal statutes. In §104 of the Crimes
Code, the legislature announces that its principal substantive purpose for passing the
Code was to “forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably inflicts or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interest.”32 In other places in the Code, the object of the
legislature’s actions is phrased more colorfully as the “harm or evil” the statute is to
prevent.
The phrase “harm or evil” is adopted from the Model Penal Code.33 It appears
often in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code in circumstances where it is juxtaposed with a
consideration of the elements of the criminal offenses. For example, in §103, the
legislature writes:

governed by statute but that it is wholly “grounded in double jeopardy safeguards afforded” by the US
Constitution. Commonwealth v. Newton, 875 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) @ ****8.
29.
18 Pa.C.S. §3502.
30.
18 Pa.C.S. §3502(d). Another example of the plain speaking by the Legislature in this
regard is the statute dealing with invasion of privacy, 18 Pa. C.S 7507.1. Section A.1 of that statute
specifies that multiple victims of one incident shall be treated in separate counts as well as multiple
incidents to one victim.
31.
1Pa.C.S. §1921(c)(3).
32.
18 Pa.C.S. §103(1).
33.
MPC §2.02(6).
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MATERIAL ELEMENT OF AN OFFENSE. An element that does not
relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any
other matter similarly unconnected with:
(1) the harm or evil incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense; or
(2) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct.34
By this juxtaposition, we see that while the harm or evil is not an element of an offense
itself, and elements can relate to things other than the harm or evil sought to be
prevented, a material element serves, in part, to identify the legislative purpose in
eradicating that particular harm or evil.
Similarly, where the legislature addressed the issue of successive prosecutions of
a defendant, either within the state35 or in Pennsylvania after a prosecution in another
jurisdiction,36 one of the tests for determining whether the second prosecution will be
allowed is whether the law defining the offense is intended to prevent a substantially
different harm or evil.37
If merger is all about legislative intent, then determining legislative intent is all
about identifying the harm, evil and or mischief the statute is supposed to remedy. For a
number of years, Pennsylvania Courts conducted a merger inquiry by openly seeking out
the harm or evil in each statute. Unfortunately, they did so in a manner so confusing that

34.
18 Pa.C.S. §103.
35.
18 Pa.C.S. §110.
36.
18 Pa.C.S. §111.
37.
A court is also called upon to consider the harm or evil a statute identifies when
determining if conditional intent may satisfy the mens rea element, §302 and when considering if consent
is a proper defense to the particular charge. §311. Moreover, a court asked to dismiss a charge as de
minimis must inquire whether, although the facts fit the technical elements of an offense, the conduct did
not “actually cause or threaten the harm or evil” the legislature was going after. §312. And finally, a court
determining a matter of self defense must weigh if a person was justified in using force to avoid a “harm or
evil” to himself or others greater than the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law proscribing his
conduct. §503.
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they ultimately abandoned that analysis when all that should have been abandoned was
the confusing approach taken to reaching it.
1. Early Attempts at Finding the Evil.
The Superior Court characterized the older form of inquiry this way in 1986:
Common law merger requires us to consider whether, as a practical matter,
appellant committed a single criminal act . . .Instead of looking solely to the
elements of the offenses charged, the court must look to the underlying
facts. Also, an examination of the statutes under which appellant has been
convicted is essential. It is important to determine whether the facts reveal
that the offenses charged caused more than one injury to the
Commonwealth. . . In doing so, we must attempt to ascertain the legislative
intent.38
Instead of finding what the legislature wanted by reading what the legislature wrote or
pondering the elements of the offense, this approach asked the courts to look at some
undefined conglomerate of facts and injuries disembodied from the statutes defining the
offense.
In Commonwealth v. Leon Williams in 1989, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
found that the common law test that had emerged was almost incomprehensible.39 As a

38.
39

Campbell, 505 A.2d at 266.
[M]erger is required only when two prerequisites are met. First, the crimes must
"necessarily involve" one another. Second, even if the two crimes necessarily
involve one another, they do not merge if there are substantially different interests
of the Commonwealth at stake and the defendant's act has injured each interest. To
determine whether multiple offenses involve substantially different interests, or
how many evils are present in a given criminal act, the sentencing court must
examine both the language of the particular statutes and the context in which each
statute appears in the Crimes Code.

...
Crimes "necessarily involve" each other, therefore, if one of two possible scenarios
occurs: (1) the crimes have the same elements n1 (i.e., lesser included offenses),
n2 or (2) the facts of the case are such that although the elements of the crimes
differ, the facts which establish one criminal charge also serve as the basis for an
additional criminal charge.
...
If it is determined that the elements of the crimes charged are the same, or that the
same operative facts underlie the crimes charged, the court must then, under the
analysis set out in [the prior case], determine whether the Commonwealth has
substantially different interests in prosecuting the defendant for two or more
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result, the Court abandoned this test, finding the interests of the Commonwealth in
enacting any criminal statue were “difficult to define with any precise degree of
certainty” and that the prior approach provided no guidance as to how a court might
determine “how many evils” are present in any one act.40 The so-called “common law”
rule was nothing more than “a mask for the reality that there is no cohesive, complete set
of rules for determining when merger should occur.”41
Into the breech left by the abandonment of this old rule, the Court in 1989 offered
a formula as simple as one could seemingly be:
[W]e now hold that except for lesser included offenses, the doctrine of
merger based on whether the Commonwealth has an interest in prosecuting
a criminal defendant for more than one crime is hereby abrogated and
abolished.42
At first blush, this formulation seemed to do away with harm or evil analysis. In truth, it
served that analysis quite well, although in an incomplete manner.
2. Seeing Harm or Evil in Elements
In the first instance, the harm or evil a statute attacks is easy to discern. Even
before the abandonment of the language of harm or evil in merger analysis, the courts had
a profound insight: the best way to understand the harm or evil in any statute is to gaze
upon it using the clarity provided by the elements of that offense. Criminal statutes
separate crimes. What the court is really asked to do at the second stage of the
analysis is make two determinations: (1) what interests of the Commonwealth are
at stake in the offenses charged; and (2) how the facts of the case bear on the
Commonwealth's interests. The latter point is expressed in [the prior] opinion as
"how many evils are present in a given criminal act... In other words, at step two a
court has to determine exactly how the Commonwealth has been injured (how
many "evils" are present) based on the court's understanding of the
Commonwealth's interests and the facts of the case. [Emphasis Added].
Leon Williams, 559 A.2d at 27-29 (quoting Commonwealth v. Michael Williams, 522 A.2d 1095
(Pa. 1987).
40.
Leon Williams, 559 A.2d at 28-29.
41.
Id. at 29.
42.
Id.
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“contain different elements designed to protect different interests,”43 and it is in the
elements that the core of legislative intent may be seen.
There is no need in the first stage of a merger analysis to look at amorphous
“facts” or “injuries” that exist, if at all, somewhere outside the language of the statute.
The elements of the offense are the best and surest means of letting the legislature speak
to the court about what it intends insofar as the potential of consecutive sentences is
concerned.44 Where each offense has at least one element distinct from the other, a
different harm or evil is involved and consecutive punishments are authorized.45
The principal Pennsylvania merger statute, enacted in 2002, speaks to this
concept. The statute provides:
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise
from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one
offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense.
Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence
the defendant only on the higher graded offense.46
43.
Sayko, 515 A.2d at 897. The “elemental” analysis of merger is adopted quite expressly in
Ohio, see R.C. §2941.25, State v. Barnette, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6691, 6713-14 (Ct. App. 2004),
Colorado, State v. Petschow, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1743, 1762 (Ct. App. 2004). New Mexico, State v.
Campos, 921 P.2d 1266, 1273 (N.M. 1996) (citing State v. Meadors, 908 P.2d 731, 734-37 (N.M.
1995)).and, to a significant degree, in Illinois. See Illinois v. Davis, 821 N.E.2d 1154, 1177 (Ill. 2004)
(citing People v. Novak, 643 N.E.2d 762, 775-83 (Il. 1994); People v. Hamilton, 688 N.E.2d 1166, 1171
(Il. 1997)), and the United States Military. Young, Colonel James A., Article: Multiplicity and LesserIncluded Offenses, 39 A.F.L. REV. 159, 160-61 (1996).
44.
Note that the Blockburger test is not conclusive on the issue of legislative intent, but only
provides an indication of intent, Nolan, supra note 2, at 527, as legislatures have the sole responsibility for
defining criminal offenses. The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the Constitution, supra note 13, at
123-24 (citing Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985) (there are no constitutional constraints on
the legislature’s power to define offenses) (citing Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927)); Brown
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (“The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one
punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure the punishment in
more than one trial.”) (citation omitted). The Blockburger test is a statutory construction tool used to aid in
the determination of legislative intent. Id. at 123 However, in the absence of clear legislative intent, the
courts are forced to combine some offenses in order to comply with the Double Jeopardy Clause; thus the
Clause serves as a check on the judiciary. Nolan, supra note 2, at 529.
45.
This test, derived from Blockburger is, as Professor Poulin illustrates, a test for legislative
intent, nor double jeopardy. See Poulin, supra note 7.
46.
42 Pa.C.S §9765. New York also governs much of its merger analysis by statutes far
more detailed than those of Pennsylvania. New York uses a detailed statute to describe when two
prosecutions may proceed from the same act or transaction, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.20, another to help
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While this statute covered the ground the Pennsylvania Courts had surveyed by 2002
already, and embodies Blockburger, it simplified the first phase of merger analysis
considerably. By the use of the term “and” connecting the “crimes arising from a single
criminal act” and the “elements included” components, the legislature allowed the court
to end the merger analysis if either is not satisfied. Starting with the simplest component,
then, unless the crimes are under the same section of the Code or are otherwise included
within each other, merger is impossible and consideration of whether the offenses arose
from a “single criminal act” is unnecessary.
By setting crimes out in different sections and giving each an element the other
does not, the legislature sends a clear message that a different “mischief,” a distinct
“harm or evil,” is the target of each statute, and separate and consecutive sentences are
authorized.47
As simple an idea as this may seem, the courts struggled with it for some time.
Five years after announcing what the Court surely hoped was the definitive
resolution of the matter in Leon Williams, the simple rule had to be revisited.

In

Commonwealth v. Anderson in1994, the Court recalled that in the period since Leon

define when a “separate and distinct” offense occurs. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 40.10, and yet another to
specify the term “lesser included offense.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20.
47.
Evans, 901 A.2d at 528 (crimes of unlawful contact with a minor for the purpose of
engaging in an indecent assault and subsequent indecent assault do not merge for sentencing);
Commonwealth v. Payne, 868 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (crimes of aggravated assault and robbery
do not merge because each contains elements that the other does not); Gatling, 807 A.2d at 900-01 (crimes
of statutory sexual assault and corruption of a minor do not merge); Collins, 764 A.2d at 1059 (homicide by
vehicle and homicide by vehicle DUI do not merge because the legislature specifically crafted the statutory
elements as mutually exclusive: homicide by vehicle requires a non-DUI Vehicle Code conviction, while
homicide by vehicle DUI requires DUI conviction); Commonwealth v. Dobbs, 682 A.2d 388 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996)(reckless endangerment merges into aggravated assault ); Commonwealth v. Rosario-Hernandez,
666 A.2d 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (aggravated assault merged into voluntary manslaughter).
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Williams, it decided Commonwealth v. Weakland,48 in which a defendant assaulted a
bystander to a robbery and then kidnapped him. To resolve the merger question there,
the Weakland Court asked whether the act of force necessary to kidnapping was greater
than that needed for the assault, an analysis wandering away from a strict consideration
of the elements of the crimes charged.
In Anderson, however, the court reasserted the primacy of the elements analysis
in merger. Looking first at amounts of force necessary to commit crimes was a flawed
first step; the first step is always whether the elements are contained within each other.
The Court held:
Whether the criminals in these cases committed one act or many is of no
import. In either event, so long as the crimes are not greater and lesser
included offenses, they are liable for as many crimes as they are convicted
of and may be sentenced for each such crime.
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Williams and abrogate the holding
in Weakland. We now hold that in all criminal cases, the same facts may
support multiple convictions and separate sentences for each conviction
except in cases where the offenses are greater and lesser included offenses.
"The same facts" means any act or acts which the accused has performed
and any intent which the accused has manifested, regardless of whether
these acts and intents are part of one criminal plan, scheme, transaction or
encounter, or multiple criminal plans, schemes transactions or encounters. In
other words, it does not matter for purposes of merger whether one regards
Weakland's striking the customer and kidnapping him as one encounter or as
two encounters, for the same facts, i.e., striking the victim with a gun, may
be used to satisfy the force requirements of at least two crimes, kidnapping
and aggravated assault, and the sentences for each crime will not merge
because these crimes are not greater and lesser included offenses.49
To be sure, this new resolution helped focus the matter a good deal. It teaches later
courts that the key in any merger analysis is to first look at the relation between the two
crimes of conviction. If they are not the same charge, or one is not lesser included with

48.
49.

555 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 1989).
Anderson, 650 A.2d at 22.
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the other, they do not merge. Discussions about how many criminal acts there were are
superfluous unless the elements of each crime can be fit into the other.
In Anderson, the crimes of aggravated assault and attempted murder fit into each
other where they arose from the defendant firing a single gunshot at the victim.50 It was
an easy solution: the crimes merged.
But

overall,

Anderson

is

an

incomplete

answer

to

merger.

The

Anderson/Blockburger/§9765 test is simple but not symmetrical: while crimes that are
not contained within each other do not merge, crimes that are contained within each only
merge some of the time. They merge only when they arise from “a single criminal act,”
something undefined in the statute and difficult to capture.
3. The Single Criminal Act
There are two, distinct scenarios in which a court may face a merger problem
where the crimes of conviction are contained within each other. In the first, two or more
victims are created by one criminal act and, in the second, one victim suffers what are
arguably two or more crimes at the hand of the defendant. The harm or evil in these
contexts cannot be seen through the simple device of the elements but may be viewed by
a careful reading of the statutes from the view point of the victim. The overall issue is still
the same: what did the Legislature intend.
a. Two or More Victims
The first scenario is where a defendant commits an act that does harm to more
than one person. If Anderson’s single gun shot struck two people, the merger analysis
would call for a single sentence only if we presumed that the legislature wanted to give

50.

Id. at 23-24.
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the offender a “volume discount” for assaulting two people at once. This absurd result
has been regularly rejected,51 because it contradicts the plain words of the statutes.
Criminal homicide is causing the death of “another human being;”52 assault and
aggravated assault are causing or attempting to cause some form of bodily injury “to
another;”53 reckless conduct may place “another person” in danger of death or serious
bodily injury.54 Conversely, where the crime makes a group the victim (like Risking a
Catastrophe §3302, in which causing or risking “potentially widespread injury or
damage” is the essence of the offense), a different result should logically follow.
The “two victims” cases are relatively easy. The far more difficult situation arises
in the second scenario where there is only one victim who potentially suffered multiple
harms. Where, for example, a defendant strikes a victim nine times, is it a continuous
assault yielding one aggravated assault or is it nine simple assaults, each of which should
be punished separately? Here, the harm or evil the legislature intended is more difficult
to see but a thoughtful approach to it is still possible.
b. Same Victim: Two Harms
The approaches taken by courts to date have focused a court on finding facts
about the defendant’s conduct and/or his change in intent during the conduct. These
attempts have been less than satisfying.
51.
Comer, 716 A.2d at 599 (offenses of homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter
merged when the defendant crashed into a bus stop killing a person); Sayko, 515 A.2d at 896 (defendant’s
acts of inducing a child to sit on his lap, touching her, exposing his genitals and ejaculating on her hands
led to convictions for indecent assault, indecent exposure and corrupting the morals of a minor, which did
not merge for sentencing); Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1101 (defendant’s act of reckless driving placed nine
pedestrians in danger of serious bodily injury; nine counts of REAP were sustained and consecutive
sentences for each authorized); Commonwealth v. Yates, 562 A.2d 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (two
aggravated assault convictions for seriously injuring two people by firing a single gunshot did not merge);
McCoy, 895 A.2 at 18 (defendant’s convictions for driving under general impairment and driving under the
highest rate of alcohol led to concurrent sentences).
52.
18 Pa.C.S. §2501.
53.
18 Pa.C.S. §2701; 18 Pa.C.S. §2702.
54.
18 Pa.C.S. §2705.
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In Commonwealth v. Gatling, two of the Justices tried to form a test for
determining whether a “single criminal act” occurred. It would be a single act, they said,
unless there was a “break in [the] chain” of events.55 Three things would be necessary
for a “break.” First, “the acts constituting commission of the first crime were completed
before the defendant began committing the second crime;” second, “proof of the second
crime did not in any way rely on the facts necessary to prove the first crime;” and third,
there was either “a significant temporal lapse” or “a change in the criminal intent of the
defendant at some point during the sequence.”56
Justice Saylor concurred in Gatling but rejected the test, finding it both too
narrow and too confusing. The factors listed by the plurality were “open to subjective
interpretation and may be difficult to definitively resolve,” he wrote, and the “issue of
distinctness is best assessed according to the totality of the circumstances.”57
Unfortunately, his opinion did not identify which “circumstances” form the
“totality” the court should assess. Indeed, while acknowledging that the key inquiry is
“whether or not the General Assembly intended for the crimes to be deemed greater and
lesser included offenses,” Justice Saylor left his analysis asking for a further development
in the law to clarify what role the trial evidence should play in discerning that intent.58
The dissenters argued that it was virtually impossible to determine whether a
lapse in a defendant’s conduct signaled a newly formed intent or was just a pause in one

55.
56.
57.
58.

Gatling, 807 A.2d at 900.
Id.
Id. at 901 (Saylor, J., concurring).
Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
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formed earlier; basing a merger analysis on that inscrutable issue would leave the merger
doctrine hopelessly adrift.59
While cases after Gatling have recognized that it lacks precedential authority,60
they, too, focus on either time gaps per se or try to intuit the intent shift they think such
gaps might signify. But how long a time gap lasts or what occasioned it put the issue out
of focus. The issue, as always, is what did the legislature intend to make of the actions
that occur on either side of the time gap, however long it is.
One bullet, fired in a split second with the intent to kill but one victim may kill
the victim and an innocent bystander. The two counts of homicide will not merge as the
legislature intended to protect each victim separately. Conversely, the driver who drives
while inebriated to the point he is incapable of safe driving and whose blood alcohol is
above the legal limit at the same moment may receive only one sentence for DUI.61 His
violations of the same statute occur as simultaneously as did the killings in the prior

59.
Gatling, 807 A.2d at 903 (Cappy, J., dissenting). The District of Colombia has some
version of this intent approach. The Courts there refer to the doctrine of “fresh impulse”, under which if a
defendant has completed one crime and then stops to consider whether to commit another crime and then
proceeds, the two acts are separate. Stevenson v. United States, 760 A.2d 1034 (D.C. 2000); Baker v.
United States, 205 D.C. App. LEXIS 28 (D.C. 2005).
California has another. Section 654 of the California Penal Code generally informs the issue.
Under Section 654, again the initial inquiry is whether there is an indivisible transaction. People v.
Coleman, 108 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973). In determining whether a course of conduct is indivisible, the actor’s
intent and objective control. Id. This inquiry is one of fact for the court to decide whether the defendant’s
criminal intent and objective were single or multiple. People v. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1119 (Ct. App. 1996).
For example, if a defendant entertained multiple independent criminal objectives, that were not merely
incidental to one another, then the defendant may be punished for the independent violations, even though
the violations were part of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. People v. Butler, 184 Cal. App.3d
469 (Ct. App. 1986). In this type of situation the temporal proximity of the offenses is not controlling and
does not preclude multiple punishment. People v. McCoy, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1578 (Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Butler, 184 Cal. App. 3d 469 (Ct. App. 1986).
60.
See Shank, 883 A.2d at 669-70; Commonwealth v. Healey, 836 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003).
61.
McCoy, 895 A.2d at 18.
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example but his convictions do merge because the legislature intended to punish only one
harm or evil, the increased risk of danger on the highways.62
It is not that time gaps are wholly unimportant to this phase of merger analysis.
But they must be seen from the perspective of the victim, not the defendant. Gaps may
indicate that, given the language the legislature used, a second harm or evil has occurred
during a criminal event that the legislature intended to punish separately. The problem
with focusing on time generally is that it diverts the court’s attention away from the
central issue of what the legislature intended. That intention is best seen in the language
of the statutes.
i. The Human Victim and the Assault Statutes
The language in assault statutes best reveals legislative intent when we identify
the subject, object and verb of each section. The subject is the defendant who acts upon
the object (the victim). In homicide statutes, the verb is some variation of “to kill” and
the legislative intent is clear. In assault crimes, the verb is different in ways important to
the analysis of whether the legislature intends the conduct to be one assault or two.
In assault offenses, the defendant either causes bodily injury (serious or
otherwise) or attempts to cause it. Each verb defines a particular criminal event in which
the victim is subjected to assaultive behavior that, at some point, comes to an end and
allows for an assessment by society of what damage was done or intended.
Attempts are, by their very nature, incidents that terminate after a substantial step
was taken but before the actual harm the statute sought to prevent was actually brought
about. They end because the attacker falsely believes he has accomplished his object, has
a change of heart, the police or a good Samaritan intervene, or for any other reason.
62.

Id.
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Looked at from the victim’s perspective, an attempt is over when the victim has again
regained some measure of control over their own circumstances and society is left with
the capacity to assess what has or may have happened to them had the attack not ceased.
At that point, they are no longer experiencing the event of assault the legislature sought to
prevent.
When the legislature punishes the form of assault that amounts to “causing” some
form of injury, the analysis is the same. To assess the degree of damage done and fix the
proper grade of the assault, the court (society) needs to be able to look back on a
completed event in which the victim was subjected to assaultive behavior at the hands of
the defendant. From the victim’s perspective, that event cannot be over until the victim
has regained some measure of control and when society could intervene and assess the
damage done for charging purposes.
While we specify the type of assault based upon the injury caused or portended,
we demarcate an event of assault as the harm or evil covered by the statute. Because of
how the legislature defines the crime, the event begins when the victim is subjected to the
defendant’s assaultive behavior and ends when a reasonable person in the victim’s shoes
has regained or been afforded sufficient control over his situation that society can assess
the damage done to him.63 If the event of assault has ended, any new event is a fresh
crime that does not merge.64
There is an effective and familiar formulation I submit the court may use to assess
the end of the event of assault. The line of demarcation between assaults occurs when a

63.
Contrast with kidnapping 18 Pa.C.S. §2901: Crime is either “unlawfully remove” or
“unlawfully confine,” implying a broader, ongoing type of harm or evil to which the victim is subjected.
64.
Assaults on two different days do not merge. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d
246 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
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reasonable person, objectively viewing the circumstances from the perspective of the
victim, would believe the assault had ended. At that point, society could affix the proper
nature and degree of assault that had occurred by assessing the damage done or
attempted.
Making the formulation objective is effective when compared with the other
possible subjective perspectives. Assessing the endpoint from the perspective of the
defendant by trying to determine his intent is too inscrutable and provides too little
protection for victims. Asking a victim if he subjectively believed the event was over
also unnecessarily complicates this determination, as either the excessively timid victim
or the one filled with unusual bravado will skew the outcome in a way the legislature
surely did not intend. Moreover, some victims in these cases would subjectively be
unconscious, so the question is better phrased whether an objective person who was able
to assess all the attendant circumstances from the perspective of the victim would
reasonably believe the assault was over.
Viewing the situation objectively, with the primary focus of concern being with
the victim, allows the court to render this judgment as a matter of law, defining the event
of assault that the legislature so evidently did intend when it defined the crime as it did.
The proposed formulation is also familiar because it evokes language the courts
have used to determine when a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes. The Supreme
Court of the United States has repeatedly held that Miranda warnings are required only
when police questioning occurs in a circumstance where “a reasonable person in the
suspect's situation would perceive” he was in custody.65 This test is objective and,
because of that objectivity, it gives a sense of certainty, stability and “clarity” to these
65.

Yarborough v.Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004).
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assessments.66 It is a formulation unconcerned with the complicating factors of the
subjective perceptions of the actual defendant or the subjective intent of the officers to
take him into custody.67
The formulation I propose to carry out the merger analysis when assault crimes
are at issue also seeks the stability objectivity can bring. It requires no specific fact
finding with respect to the defendant’s intent and allows for a sensible appraisal of when
the actions which constitute an event of assault have so subsided that society can now
assess it under the terms the legislature has dictated. Importantly, this formulation never
loses sight of the fact that the legislature put the victim’s interests first. This approach
thus requires a sentencing court to assess gaps of time from the viewpoint of the victim
the legislature aspired to protect.68 The legislature afforded protection based upon the
harm the event caused or portended, a measure fixed when the event is over, when the
victim could have or did regain control and when the damage done could be calculated.
While the reasoning of neither the majority nor the dissent would be fully
consonant with the above, the analysis of the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.

66.
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667, quoting, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “[t]he test for custodial interrogation does not depend upon
the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer, but rather, focuses on whether the individual being
interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda,
855 A.2d 783, 790 (Pa. 2004).
67.
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1994), citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442
("the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation.")
68.
Focusing on the matter from the perspective of the defendant’s acts also runs a risk.
While no court has held that merger analysis may run afoul of the Apprendi doctrine – Santana-Madera v.
United States, 260 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001); Washington v. Kinney, 106 P.3d 274 (Wash. App. 2005);
Collins v. State, 717 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. 1999); New Hampshire v. Higgins, 821 A.2d 964 (N.H. 2003) Q,R,T, – JJ, and LL, none of those cases have applied a test wherein the court must determine factually
whether the defendant shifted his intent at mid-act or whether he subjective sought to break off the attack
and then resume it. The approach posited in this article disdains any factual determination of the
defendant’s intent in favor of accepting the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and
examining the language of the statute to discern whether the victim reasonably perceived the event
described in the statute had ended.
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Belsar69 is a good illustration of the point. The victim was ambushed by Belsar who shot
him five times. Leaving the victim for dead, Belsar and a co-defendant searched for the
victim’s car keys in another location while the victim attempted to crawl away.70 Belsar
realized the victim was still alive and set upon him a second time with a volley of kicks.
The court held that aggravated assault and attempted murder in this circumstance did not
merge as “[w]hen a criminal act has been committed, broken off, and then resumed, at
least two crimes have occurred and sentences may be imposed for each. To hold that
multiple assaults constitute only one crime is to invite criminals like Belsar to brutalize
their victims with impunity.”71
The victim in Belsar was subjected to an attack that a reasonable person would
perceive had ended when the assailants, thinking the victim was incapacitated, abandoned
him to search for his keys. A second attack resumed when Belsar returned and subjected
the victim to a new event of assault. Whether separated by a minute or an hour, two
events of assault were present here.
A result difficult to square with this analysis or any other is the one reached in
Commonwealth v. Wesley,72 a case that misunderstands the “broken off” concept of
Belsar.
The defendant first shot his victim in the back while the victim bent over to pick
up his son.73 The victim then tried to grab the weapon, resulting in the defendant firing
again, blowing off the victim’s finger. The defendant then fired several more rounds into
the victim’s stomach and leg. Miraculously, the victim survived.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

676 A.2d 632 (Pa. 1996)
Belsar, 676 A.2d at 633.
Id. at 634.
860 A.2d 585 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2004).
Wesley, 860 A.2d at 587.
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Here, unlike Commonwealth v. Anderson, where the same offenses merged,
Wesley was sentenced consecutively to terms accumulating to 32 1/2 to 65 years on
counts of aggravated assault and attempted murder. There was no merger, the Superior
Court said, because the attack was “broken off’ after the first shot and resumed with the
shots to the hand and torso of the victim.74
Disgust at the wanton nature of the defendant’s conduct does not justify a result
that cannot withstand careful scrutiny. Using the Court’s reasoning, the shot to the hand
and each shot to the torso could be separate counts. But unless an assault is comprised of
one blow or one round fired, some time lapse will always exist between successive
actions that could sustain the capricious attribution of a “broken off” attack.

No

reasonable person could have concluded otherwise. If the legislature intended each shot
fired to be a crime, they surely could have said so, but they most surely did not.
Wesley’s victim was subjected to one event of assault that began with the first
shot and ended when Wesley quit pulling the trigger after firing multiple rounds. The
victim never regained any measure of control of the situation and there was no chance for
a societal intervention of the continuous event. What the court’s opinion illustrates is that
the “broken off” analysis invites the same kind of arbitrariness that is “a mask for the
reality that there is no cohesive, complete set of rules for determining when merger
should occur.”75 That a court thinks conduct is so callous that it merits more of a
sentence than the law of merger allows is not an excuse to render the analysis incoherent.
If merger analysis is to be coherent, it must require a more faithful search for
legislative intent than the “broken off” argument provides. Torturing the merger doctrine

74..
75.

Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 29.
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is not the way to expose a legislative sentencing scheme that is too lenient in a given
case.
ii. Society as the Victim: the Possession Crimes
Sometimes the only victim is society. The matter commonly arises in possession
cases, but there as well the language of the statute is the first and best clue to the
underlying harm or evil each separate offense is supposed to prevent.
A trilogy of cases illustrates the methodology.76
In Commonwealth v. Woods, the Superior Court ruled that where a defendant
possessed an unlicensed firearm during the course of two assaults occurring on the same
day, only one sentence for possessing an unlicensed firearm “upon the public streets” was
permitted.77
The court noted that Woods’ possession of the firearm that day was for an
“uninterrupted period” of time including the assaults and an “indeterminate period of
time before and after” them.78 As the possession would have occurred regardless of
whether he committed the assaults, the question of statutory construction was joined:
In the context of an uninterrupted or continuous carrying of a weapon at
what point does one stop "carrying" a firearm on the street and start anew?
Does one commit a violation of the Act with every step he takes while
carrying a firearm? Or does one commit a violation based upon a certain
passage of time? If so, how much time must pass before a new offense
begins? Is it a separate offense for every hour one carries a weapon? Or
every ten minutes?79

76.
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Stenhouse,
788 A.2d 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
77.
18 Pa.C.S. §6108.
78.
Woods, 710 A.2d at 632.
79.
Id. at 631.
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As the verb “carry” connotes continuous action, and as the statute “is not predicated upon
the commission of a crime with the weapon,” the court concluded that the statute could
only be violated once in this context.80
One could only assume, however, that if Woods decided to carry his weapon on
Day One and then ventured out again on Day Two, the result would be different. The
unlicensed person who carries a firearm upon a public street presents a certain kind of
danger that recurs each time he ventures out into that venue. If mere possession of a
firearm without a license was the object harm or evil, the legislature would not have used
the verb “carry” nor the clauses dealing with the specific venues in which such carrying
would be a crime.
In Commonwealth v. Andrews, the defendant also possessed a firearm, this time
during three robberies over two days. The charge in Andrews was different than in
Woods, however, as Andrews was charged with possessing an instrument of a crime:
(a) Criminal instruments generally.-- A person commits a misdemeanor
of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to
employ it criminally.81
Here, the court said, while “to possess” is less specific than to “carry”, mere possession
of a firearm does not make out the crime; rather, in Model Penal Code terms, the
defendant’s “criminal purpose” was the “touchstone of his liability.”82 Andrews violated
the possession statute each time he possessed his firearm with the intent to commit a
separate robbery, and three separate sentences could be imposed.
Again, discerning legislative intent here is not difficult. Society fears the event of
an individual possessing an instrument with the intent to perpetrate a crime with it. Each
80.
81.
82.

Id.
18 Pa.C.S. §907(a).
Andrews, 768 A.2d at 317.
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time possession joins with such intent, a separate societal harm occurs, meriting separate
sanction.83
The third case in the trilogy is the most difficult. In Commonwealth v. Stenhouse,
the defendant was convicted of two counts of possession and possession with intent to
deliver controlled substances after the police found quantities of drugs at each of two
residences he maintained.84 The court first observed that there was no evidence that the
drugs were originally obtained at one time or from one source of supply.85 If they were
bought separately, Stenhouse “must have combined them before they were again
divided.”86 But, ultimately, this was superfluous, the majority said, since “the propriety
of multiple charges is determined by the facts at the time of the charge, not by history.”87
Coming up with a methodology to resolve whether this was one, continuous
possession of drugs or two independent acts was difficult, however, and the majority
ultimately did not try.
Subdivision of a single quantity of drugs may not warrant separate charges
in all cases. We must rely on trial courts to deal with the issue on a case-bycase basis, and cannot create a broad rule that covers every situation. We
certainly cannot preclude multiple possessory crimes simply because drugs
are fungible or sold from multiple outlets.88
But what is it in each “case-by-case” analysis that will be dispositive?

83.
In Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), the Court held that
the offense of possessing child pornography (18 Pa.C.S. §6312), criminalized the possession of any “book,
magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or other material depicting a
child under the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act commits
an offense.”
84.
Stenhouse, 788 A.2d at 384.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
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The dissent focused on the meaning of the act of possession. A crime charging
possession is complete upon the defendant exercising dominion and control over the item
possessed and the crime continues with respect to that item as long as dominion and
control are maintained.89 If the defendant acquired the item (drugs) at different times,
then dominion and control would be separately exercised in each occasion.90 In such a
case, the new crime is complete upon acquisition; dividing it up after acquisition does not
make a new instance of possession.91
But there were two crimes charged with respect to each drug location, possession
and possession with intent to deliver. The latter offense is like possession of a criminal
instrument where, beyond just the act of possessing, the legislature identities a harm or
evil associated specifically with the intent with which the possessing is done.92 The harm
or evil in the “intent to deliver case” is the danger the possession of the drugs creates that
some part of them will be distributed in the community. The criminal event the statute
identifies is the act of a defendant exercising dominion and control over a quantity of
drugs and simultaneously evidencing an intent to dispense them to others. Both aspects
are needed with respect to any particular quantity of drugs specified.93

89.
Stenhouse, 788 A.2d at 385 (Brosky, J., dissenting).
90.
Id. at 385-86 (Brosky, J., dissenting).
91.
Id. at 385, 389-90 (Brosky, J., dissenting).
92.
While not specifically arguing this additional aspect of legislative intent as inferred from
the language of intent in the statute, the majority did observe :
Even accepting appellant's allegations as gospel, this was not merely repackaging
and moving a portion of a larger mass to another bag or room. There are two
locations here, in separate municipal jurisdictions, miles apart, and we can find no
error in treating one stockpile as separate and distinct from the other. If appellant
chose to have branch offices for his business, the inventory at each office may form
the basis for a separate possessory crime. [emphasis supplied].
Id. at 384-85.
93.
If a search of a defendant’s house revealed two bags of cocaine with a detailed set of
instructions to his subordinate to deliver them to each of two separate persons, two counts of PWID would
arise. If but one large bag of drugs was found with a note to the subordinate to divide the drugs in half and
distribute them to the two people, arguably only one count of PWID would arise since each count needs its
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Thus, the majority in Stenhouse was right that dividing up drugs into piles
coupled with evidence of intent to distribute each made out separate offenses for
sentencing purposes. The dissent was right that where the crime is simply possession at a
given place and time, all the cocaine possessed by a defendant is part of one count, one
crime.

Only where the Commonwealth could charge and prove that the defendant

acquired drugs on distinct occasions of acquisition could two counts of possession be the
subject of separate sentences.94
C. Conclusion
Imperfections in this or any other legislative intent-based analysis is, in fact, a
benefit courts will derive from treating the merger question as nothing more than an
attempt to figure out what the legislature wanted. In fact, by treating merger in this way,
benefits abound, even if the approach suggested proves less than satisfying in all cases.
First, bad legislation can be readily identified. Silk purses of merger analysis
cannot be made out of the sow’s ears of poorly drafted criminal statutes. Problems in
fixing maximum penalties for certain crimes may be laid at the feet of those responsible
in Harrisburg, Albany or Sacramento.
Second, courts can re-discover the Constitution in the context of sentencing.
Rather than confusing the true Constitutional issues that arise in a sentencing with a
Constitutional doctrine like Double Jeopardy that has no place there, courts can explore
whether there is more content to aspects of Due Process or Cruel and Unusual
own act (a possession) and an intent. While two intents exist, only one act is present. See also
Commonwealth v. Proietto 361 A.2d 712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
94.
An interesting application of a court trying to discern legislative intent in this area is
found in Commonwealth v. Gruber, 548 A.2d 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The defendant’s possession of
marijuana and hashish in the same place and the same time were found to merge because the court
determined that each was a derivative of the same plant and the legislature intended a common punishment
as a result.
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Punishment protections (under federal or state constitutions) than they have ever had
occasion to explore. Perhaps these will turn out to be dry wells for civil liberties, but
courts now have the freedom to find out. However they go about answering the strict
merger question, they know they need not spend any Constitutional capital in doing so.
Finally, there is a potential third benefit that is also a third reason to contemplate
the whole area of merger itself.
Merger is one of those portal issues than can take us to the center of our basic
conceptions about the place criminal law has in our society. What we make criminal
generally defines the frontier we establish between the individual and the state in any
democratic society. What we designate as an individual unit of crime, worthy of a
separate and unique punishment, is a key component of that whole inquiry.
Moreover, how does our treatment of merger reflect the indelicate balance we try
to achieve among the traditional goals of sentencing: just desserts, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation?95 Which of these goals, and any number of others, do
we choose to serve when we decide whether a man should receive nine sentences for
each of nine punches thrown, or just one sentence based on the net damage his blows
inflicted? Whether we merge tells us, fundamentally, why we seek to punish at all.
These are thoughts worth thinking. And we should address them. We should
address them, that is, right after we have helped the courts clean up the mess of merger.

95.
RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA, (NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2000). See also JACK M.
KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES, (BALLINGER
PUBLISHING COMPANY 1980), at 229-32. See also KITTRIE, ZENOFF AND ENG, SENTENCING, SANCTION
AND CORRECTIONS (2ed FOUNDATION PRESS 2002), at 60-61. See also United States Sentencing
Guidelines, Chapter 1, Part A(2), claiming that the Guidelines provide for standards to further the “basic
purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”
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